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We contend that economic preferences over risk-taking in different subnational regions worldwide 
affect fundamental aspects of firms’ corporate financing, namely financing costs and capital 
structure. We study this hypothesis, by hand-matching firms’ regions worldwide with the 
corresponding regional economic risk-taking preferences. Our baseline results show that credit and 
bond pricing increase with higher risk-taking preferences, whereas such preferences yield lower 
ratios of book leverage and short-term debt. We backup our baseline results with an instrumental 
variables approach, which is based on the premise that high-yield agricultural societies in the pre-
industrial era exhibit low risk-taking preferences.  
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Studying risk-taking by economic agents (individuals, firms, banks, etc.) is the cornerstone of the 
finance academic discipline. This literature, established by Markowitz (1952) but having its seeds 
in earlier work by classical and Keynesian economists, originates in the examination of risk-taking 
behavior to achieve higher returns. Recent studies highlight that the general economic environment 
within which economic preferences shape is considerably different between countries and even in 
different regions within countries (Falk et al., 2018; Falk et al. 2016). In this research, we 
hypothesize and empirically establish that the aggregate (regional) variation in economic 
preferences over risk-taking (henceforth risk-taking preferences) affects key corporate finance 
aspects of firms in these regions, especially financing costs and capital structure. 
In economic environments with lax attitudes toward risk-taking, there can be significantly 
higher uncertainty about the realization of firms’ investment projects. The mechanism is that firms 
in regions with higher risk-taking preferences invest in riskier projects and seek higher returns, so 
that they would be willing to pay higher financing costs. Moreover, this local attitude toward risk-
taking creates an embedded perception that investments in this region are inherently risky. Markets 
that price risk would adopt this perception and might increase financing costs. Given the above, 
the first part of our testable hypothesis is that higher preferences for risk-taking in the firms’ regions 
imply a premium in lending and/or bond rates. Differently phrased, firms in regions with higher 
risk-taking preferences might be subject to a “risk endowment,” which leads to higher financing 
costs. In turn, the firms’ goal is that higher expected returns from the financed investment projects 
potentially compensate for the higher financing costs.           
 In turn, different regional economic preferences naturally have implications for firms’ 
capital structure decisions. There are two potentially competing effects. On the one hand, in regions 
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with more lax attitudes toward risk-taking, firms might have an optimal capital structure that 
includes more leverage. However, that would be a first-order effect disregarding the potentially 
positive relation between higher risk-taking preferences and financing costs. According the trade-
off theory of capital structure, higher capital costs change the optimal debt to equity ratio by 
changing the optimal point at which adding new debt increases default risk (see e.g., Rajan and 
Zingales, 1995; Fama and French, 2002). Thus, showing that regional risk-taking preferences affect 
financing costs potentially suggests that firms in the higher-risk regions have lower debt ratios to 
avoid a bad spiral of excessive default risk. This outcome is also consistent with the pecking order 
theory of capital structure (Myers, 1984; Myers, 2001) where firms’ managers in higher-risk 
regions perceive that firms’ shares are underpriced by the markets (or, equivalently, their risk is 
overpriced), thus favoring the heavier use of internal funds for investments and leading to lower 
debt ratios. In line with these capital structure theories, the second part of our hypothesis states that 
higher regional risk-taking preferences negatively affect firms’ key leverage ratios.        
 We put our hypothesis to test, using the measure of economic preferences over risk taking 
in the Global Preferences Survey, conducted by Falk et al. (2018). This is the only study measuring 
an array of economic preferences across several countries, explicitly distinguishing between 
economic preferences and relevant cultural attitudes. Importantly, Falk et al. provide all the 
underlying data at the individual-level, mapping individuals to specific subnational regions. This 
allows us to create an index of regional risk-taking preferences in many regions worldwide, as well 
as creating additional indices of other economic preferences, such as economic preferences over 
trust, altruism, patience, etc. Apart from being observed at the regional (as opposed at the country 
level), these economic preferences indices markedly differ from previously used measures 




Subsequently, we hand-match firms in the Compustat database to these regions and further 
merge the resulting sample with corporate (syndicated) loans and bonds data from 1996 to 2018. 
We use the loans dataset (firms from 192 regions in 35 countries) and the bonds dataset (U.S. firms 
only) to examine the effect of risk-taking preferences on financing costs (measured with loan and 
bond spreads). Next, we use Compustat data from 509 regions and 58 countries to examine whether 
regional risk-taking preferences affect debt to asset ratios (total debt to total assets, as well as 
equivalent ratios of short-term debt and long-term debt). 
Our identification strategy exploits the different dimensions of our sample: risk-taking 
preferences observed at the regional level and our outcome variables observed at the loan-level, 
bond-level or firm-year level. This implies using several control variables and fixed effects, the 
latter accounting for a significant part of unobserved heterogeneity. Further, our analysis is robust 
to the inclusion of controls for other economic preferences (estimated at the regional level), culture 
(obtained from Hofstede and Schwartz), and several (literally dozens of) country-year controls 
(reflecting macroeconomic, institutional, constitutional, societal, and geographic dimensions).  
We recognize, however, that there still might be unobserved region-specific heterogeneity 
that correlates with both regional risk-taking preferences and our outcome variables. As remedy 
against such endogeneity issues, we estimate an instrumental variables (IV) model. As exogenous 
instruments we use the “potential” regional crop yield and regional crop growth cycle in the pre-
industrial era (before 1500 CE) (Galor and Özak, 2016). The potential measures, as opposed to the 
actual ones, entail information on agroclimatic constraints that are orthogonal to human 
intervention. Along with the fact that the measures are for the pre-industrial era, the exclusion 
restriction is satisfied: conditional on controls (especially controls for economic preferences other 
than risk-taking), the regional crop yield and crop growth cycle should affect contemporary 
financial conditions through risk-taking preferences. We posit and show that agricultural efficiency 
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(high crop yield and smaller crop growth cycle) in the pre-industrial era is negatively correlated 
with economic preferences over risk-taking.  
Our empirical findings from both the OLS and the IV models show that higher regional 
risk-taking preferences increase loan and bond spreads. Economically, the OLS results show that 
a one standard deviation higher regional risk-taking implies a higher loan spread by approximately 
3 basis points, which is equivalent to additional interest expenses of 0.33 million USD for the loan 
with the average size and maturity. We also find additional loan costs in the form of higher loan 
fees. The equivalent results on bond spreads are even stronger, indicating a 5.5 basis points increase 
for a one standard deviation higher risk-taking preferences, and considerable increases in bond 
interest expenses (also given the longer bond maturity compared to syndicated loan maturity). 
Moreover, the OLS results are conservative compared to the IV results. Overall, our findings are 
consistent with our hypothesis on the positive “risk endowment” effect on financing costs. 
Subsequently, consistent with the second part of our hypothesis, we identify a negative 
effect of risk-taking preferences on leverage ratios. Our baseline results show that a one standard 
deviation increase in our measure of risk-taking preferences yields an approximately 1.6% decline 
for the firms with the mean ratios of either total debt to total assets or short-term debt to total assets. 
The IV results confirm the statistical significance of the OLS results, albeit they show that the 
effect of risk-taking preferences also lowers the ratio of long-term debt to total assets. Last, we find 
that in higher risk-taking regions the speed of adjustment of firms’ target debt ratio significantly 
increases, thus providing support to the trade-off theory argument. 
 
Placement in the literature. Our findings on the effect of risk-taking preferences on financing costs 
are consistent with the premise that collective economic risk-taking preferences formulate an 
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economic environment of higher financial risk that is priced in credit and bond markets. This 
finding is aligned with previous studies of corporate loan markets showing that country-specific 
characteristics (e.g., institutions, regulations, local demand and supply factors, etc.) affect credit 
costs (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Qian and Strahan, 2007; Chui et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 
2018; Delis et al., 2020; Álvarez-Botas and González, 2020). However, our analysis points to a 
significantly different determinant of credit cost that relates to the cross-section of economic 
preferences over risk-taking that changes very slowly over time. This creates a tradeoff: firms in 
societies willing to take more risk might receive higher returns on their investment, in line with 
studies on societal determinants of corporate risk-taking (e.g., Li et al., 2013); however, these firms 
also face higher financing costs for these investments, potentially decreasing their investment 
opportunities.  
Moreover, our findings on the effect of risk-taking preferences on firms’ leverage ratios are 
in line with theoretical models of capital structure, suggesting that higher risk-taking preferences 
relate to higher capital costs (observed in our paper as increases in borrowing costs) and lower 
levels of debt that firms hold (e.g., Fama and French, 2002; Graham and Leary, 2011; Graham et 
al., 2015 and references therein). Our analysis on capital structure is further motivated from earlier 
work by Rajan and Zingales (1995), who suggest that country-specific institutional differences 
significantly affect capital structure and call for more research on what really determines capital 
structure in different parts of the world. Our analysis pinpoints that risk-taking preferences, 
working as a local endowment, affect the optimal levels of leverage.  
Our paper also naturally relates to a voluminous literature that links a society’s culture to 
corporate finance (Aggarwal et al., 2015; Karolyi, 2016). This literature empirically links cultural 
measures, either as differences between countries, i.e., cultural proximity, cultural distance, or in 
levels, with finance-related elements such as loan contract terms (Giannetti and Yafeh, 2012; 
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Fishman et al., 2017); corporate debt maturity (Zheng et al., 2012); domestic bank-risk 
(Mourouzidou-Damtsa et al., 2019); firms’ capital structure (Chui et al., 2002); stock prices (e.g., 
Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Guiso et al., 2008); firms’ dividend policy (Shao et al., 2010); 
international M&As (Ahern et al., 2015), firms’ hedging decisions (Lievenbrück and Schmid, 
2014); and firms’ external financing (Boubakri and Saffar, 2016). A common component of these 
studies is that they use cultural/societal measures of uncertainty and not measures of economic risk-
taking preferences. Our analysis shows that economic preferences over risk-taking are a key 
determinant of financing costs and capital structure, over and above any effect of societal culture. 
 
Paper’s structure. We structure the rest of our paper along the following lines. The next section 
highlights the importance of measuring regional economic preferences over risk-taking, especially 
comparing these preferences with previously used measures of culture. Section 3 analyzes the 
empirical model and data used to study the effect of risk-taking preferences on financing costs, and 
discusses the empirical results. Section 4 provides the equivalent analysis and results on the effect 
of risk-taking preferences on firms’ capital structure. Section 5 concludes the paper and analyzes 
the implications of our findings. 
   
2. Risk-taking preferences: Theoretical background and measurement 
Firms in different regions in the world face considerably different financing costs. Recent 
explanations of these differences include the roles of country-specific macroeconomic risk and 
institutional quality (Qian and Strahan, 2007; Delis et al., 2020). This paper shows that there is 
another equally important explanation of these differences: regional risk-taking preferences. An 
important distinguishing element of our analysis is that risk-taking explicitly refers to an agent’s 
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willingness to take economic risk, as this arises from the quantifiable uncertainty about economic 
outcomes (gains and losses).  
Aggregate measures of economic risk-taking preferences across several countries/regions 
are difficult to find. In this study, we use the database of Falk et al. (2018), namely the Global 
Preferences Survey (GPS).1 This database is probably the only one that specifically measures 
economic preferences over risk-taking across several nations and subnational regions.  
The GPS entails a global survey experiment, asking individuals the following: “Please 
imagine the following situation. You can choose between a sure payment of a particular amount of 
money, or a draw, where you would have an equal chance of getting amount x or getting nothing.” 
Choosing the lottery resulted in an increase in the expected value of the amount being offered, 
thereby examining the individual’s propensity to take economic risk. 
Previous measures in the World Values Survey (WVS) or Hofstede (2001) are rather distant 
from economics and reflect cultural/societal elements of risk-taking, and not economic risk-taking. 
Specifically, the WVS asks whether “Adventure and taking risks are important to this person; to 
have an exciting life.” This WVS question was derived from Schwartz (2012) and designed to 
capture a universal “value of stimulation.” Hofstede (2001) measures “uncertainty avoidance” with 
the following questions: i) “How often do you feel nervous or tense?”; (ii) “All in all, how would 
you describe your health these days?”; (iii) agreement with “One can be a good manager without 
having a precise answer to every question that a subordinate may raise about his or her work;” (iv) 
agreement with “a company’s or organization’s rules should not be broken—not even when the 
employee thinks breaking the rule would be in the organization’s best interest.”  
 
1 Available at https://www.briq-institute.org/global-preferences/downloads. 
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Evidently, all the above questions are mostly relevant to firms’ financing decisions with 
respect to cultural/societal reflections of uncertainty. In contrast, measures in the GPS speak to the 
heart of how the economic environment in the firm’s location might affect financing choices. 
Moreover, the GPS constructs other economic preferences measures, namely patience, altruism, 
trust, and reciprocity also offering the possibility to identify such preferences at the subnational 
regional level. As Becker et al. (2020) show, this variation in population-level preferences is rooted 
to the migration patterns of our early ancestors and can play an important role in determining 
contemporary economic outcomes. 
The GPS includes two files, one with country-level information for 76 countries covering 
about 90% of world’s population; and one with individual-level information for the 80,337 
respondents in the interviews. We rely on the individual-level information because this allows a 
subnational regional analysis based on the location of the firms in our sample. Specifically, the 
weights included in this file allow the calculation of regional-level economic preferences, by 
multiplying the weight with the individual’s score for each measure, and then averaging this 
product at the regional level for each variable.2 
In our analysis, the outcome variables reflect financing costs and capital structure decisions 
of firms. We conduct our empirical analysis on three datasets. The first is a loan-level dataset from 
DealScan (enriched with firm-year information from Compustat) to examine the effect of regional 
economic risk-taking preferences on the cost of credit. The second is a bond-level dataset (also 
enriched with Compustat information) to examine the equivalent effect on bond pricing. The third 
is a firm-year dataset to examine the equivalent effect on capital structure.  
 
2 We verify the correctness of this procedure by calculating the product of weight times individual’s score for each 
economic preference variable and then averaging this product at the country level. The resulting calculated country-
level variables are the same with that provided at the country-level file (for details, see the Online Appendix AD.3 in 
Falk et al., 2018).    
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Matching data for firms and regions is a labor-intensive hand-matching process. For most 
countries, the GPS regions are the administrative regions of each country, whereas for the U.S. the 
GPS regions are the states. For the U.S., we simply match the state names between the two files. 
For the rest of the countries, we rely on internet sources, searching for the city and country name 
and using the word ‘region’ as keyword search. For the very few cases where there are two or more 
cities with the same name in a country, located in different regions, or whenever there is a 
discrepancy between the city name and the country name in which the borrowing firm is 
incorporated (e.g., Montreal, France) we drop the relevant observation from the sample. Our 
regional risk-taking economic preference measure, denoted as Regional risk-taking, is the variable 
of interest in our analysis. We also construct controls for Regional patience, Regional altruism and 
Regional trust. These controls are important to saturate our model from the effect of different types 
of economic preferences.3 Table 1 includes thorough definitions for these variables and Table 2 
reports summary statistics. 
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 here] 
 
3. Economic risk-taking and firms’ financing costs 
3.1. Empirical models 
According to our key hypothesis, the financial sector incorporates risk-taking preferences in the 
pricing of financial products. Two key corporate finance products are loans and bonds. We examine 
the effect of Regional risk-taking on the cost of loans using the following model: 
 
 
3 The GPS dataset also includes measures for positive and negative reciprocity; however, we find that these measures 
do not correlate with loan spreads or affect the relation between loan spreads and economic risk-taking. Including them 
simply generates multicollinearity issues. 
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𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑙𝑏𝑓𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘-𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 + 𝐸𝑃𝑟 + 𝐿𝑙𝑡 + 𝐹𝑓𝑡 + 𝐵𝑏𝑡 + 𝐶𝑐𝑡 + 𝑢𝑙𝑏𝑓𝑟𝑡.     (1) 
 
In equation (1), Loan spread is the spread over the LIBOR (plus any facility fee) of a syndicated 
loan l given by bank b to firm f that is established in region r in year t. The control variables include 
other economic preferences variables (EP), along with vectors of loan (L), firm-year (F), bank-year 
(B), and country-year (C) variables. Equation (1) also includes several fixed effects, which help 
with empirical identification (thoroughly discussed in the next section). Finally, u is the stochastic 
disturbance. 
Syndicated loans data are from DealScan, which is the most comprehensive loan-level 
dataset that covers loans in several countries. Our sample covers 1990-2018 and includes 
information for loan pricing and several loan characteristics (e.g., loan amount, maturity, the 
existence or not of collateral, covenants, etc.). We match borrowing firms to listed firms in the 
Compustat North America and Compustat Global databases using the DealScan-Compustat linking 
tool (Chava and Roberts, 2008). Similarly, we use the DealScan lender linking tool (Schwert, 2018) 
to import lender-identifying information from Compustat.4 In this way, we enrich our dataset with 
financial characteristics for borrowers and lenders from the two Compustat databases, as well as 
borrowers’ location (address, zip code, state for US firms, country, etc.).  
We consider syndicated loans where the borrower and the lender are in the same country, 
to avoid spillovers of economic preferences between two different countries. We find that there is 
only a handful of firms that change locations (move to a different region). Furthermore, we limit 
 
4 Because the DealScan lender linking tool covers the period up to 2015, we fill-in the missing information up to 2018 
using the lender’s name.  
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the baseline analysis only to banks acting as lead arrangers, since these orchestrate the syndication 
and negotiate the loan terms with the borrowing firm.5   
The Loan spread is a key loan characteristic reflecting its riskiness, while also incorporating 
institutional and macroeconomic risk (Delis et al., 2020). Thus, the Loan spread should incorporate 
any region-specific economic preferences related to risk-taking. In further tests, we also use the 
all-in-spread-undrawn (AISU), which includes the facility fee and the commitment fee on the 
unused amount of loan commitment. 
Apart from controlling for economic preferences other than risk-taking (at the regional 
level), we include four groups of control variables (Table 1): loan-level variables, firm-year 
variables, bank-year variables, and country or country-year variables. Most importantly, we control 
for noneconomic cultural measures, such as the Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s scores. Following our 
theoretical considerations, these measures should capture cultural/societal effects, purifying the 
effect of economic risk-taking on the cost of credit from such alternative explanations. At the 
country-year level, important controls are the level of economic development (GDP per capita), 
the GDP growth rate, and the mean loan spread across the syndicated loans originated in a country 
each year. In robustness tests, we also control for dozens of additional country or country-year 
variables (see Appendix Table A1). Several of these controls reflect institutional quality; we do not 
use relevant variables in our baseline specifications because they are highly correlated with GDP 
per capita.  
The number of loan facilities using the syndicated loans sample in our baseline specification 
is 61,677, granted to 8,359 unique listed borrowers in 192 GPS regions in 35 countries. Thus, the 
regional data on economic preferences substantially increase heterogeneity and, potentially, 
 
5 Our baseline results remain unchanged when we relax this restriction.  
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estimation precision. Table 2, panel A, reports summary statistics for the variables used in the loan-
level analysis. In the Appendix Table A2, we report country-specific details on our sample. 
In turn, we examine the effect of Regional risk-taking on bond pricing. Most of the literature 
on bond prices or yields uses U.S. bond data (e.g., Elton et al., 2001; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; 
Ortiz-Molina, 2006; Braun, 2016), given data quality and availability issues.6 For the choice of 
bond-level and firm-level variables, we follow closely Ortiz-Molina (2006) and estimate the 
following model: 
 𝐵𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑠𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑏𝑓𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘-𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 + 𝐸𝑃𝑟 + 𝐵𝑏𝑡 + 𝐹𝑓𝑡 + 𝑢𝑏𝑓𝑟𝑡. (2) 
 
In equation (2), Bond spread is the spread of a bond b issued by a firm f that is established in region 
r in year t. The control variables include the same regional controls as in equation (1) for the United 
States. We also control for vectors of bond (B) and firm (F) variables. Moreover, we include 
industry fixed effects and interstate division7 fixed effects to control for relevant time-invariant 
unobserved heterogeneity in bonds’ pricing. We also include year fixed effects. Table 2, panel B, 
reports summary statistics for the U.S. bonds sample. 
 
3.2. Empirical identification and estimation results 
We begin by estimating equation (1) with fixed effects OLS. We include loan type fixed effects, 
which are important because loan facilities include credit lines and term loans that have 
 
6 Studies using bond data by firms from other countries are rare (e.g., Gabbi and Sironi, 2005). Other studies investigate 
the risk factors affecting the cross-section of bond returns (e.g., Bai et al., 2019), or explore the bond spreads’ predicting 
ability for economic fluctuations (e.g., Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012). 





fundamental differences in their contractual arrangements and pricing (Berg et al., 2016). We also 
include loan purpose fixed effects, given the considerable differences in pricing loans with different 
objectives (e.g., loans for M&As have different risks compared to loans for working capital or other 
corporate purposes). Moreover, we include industry, continent, and year fixed effects to control for 
relevant common effects on loan pricing. We cluster standard errors by country (which is more 
conservative compared to clustering by region as there might be within-country correlation of 
standard errors), but we show that our results are robust to different choices.  
 Using loan-level data, several important control variables, and several fixed effects already 
largely reduce omitted-variable bias.8 The only possible such bias may emerge from unobserved 
regional characteristics that are not controlled for by our regional and country-year variables. As 
our empirical analysis shows, our OLS results compare very well with those from an IV model. 
Table 3 reports the OLS results. In columns (1) to (5), we sequentially add control variables: 
we begin with only the regional variables reflecting economic preferences, and add loan-level 
controls, firm-level controls, bank-level controls, and macroeconomic controls. Sequentially 
adding controls shows the robustness of our findings to controls used in the literature and that our 
main results are not subject to a bad controls problem. The effect of the control variables is fully 
in line with the respective in the literature (e.g., Delis et al., 2020; Focarelli et al., 2008). The most 
important control capturing differences in the firms’ macroeconomic environment is Borrower’s 
country-year loan spread, which has a positive and highly significant coefficient.  
 
8 Moreover, using loan-level data rules out other types of endogeneity stemming from simultaneity or reverse causality, 
as we do not expect that individual loan pricing to systematically affect regional preferences over economic risk-taking. 
Further, it is unlikely that firms select regions based on risk-taking preferences: risk-taking preferences are long-lasting 
and predetermined, while we have almost zero relocation of firms in our sample (identifying relocations would have 
been an interesting identification strategy).   
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Even though we are not interested in establishing causal effects between the regional 
control variables and the loan spread, the results reflect some interesting correlations. The negative 
coefficient on Regional patience shows that banks charge lower spreads to firms in regions in which 
individuals have long-term orientation. This finding is consistent with the neoclassical view of the 
time-preference theory on interest rates, in which firms that are more willing to borrow in the future 
(e.g., because their need for liquidity is not urgent) are given better terms today. Moreover, the 
coefficient on regional trust is positive and significant, showing that higher trust implies originating 
(instead of denying) loans to riskier borrowers to which lending rates are higher.9 Regional altruism 
loses its statistical significance once we add the macroeconomic controls. 
The coefficient 𝑎1 in column (1) is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level. 
Economically, a one standard deviation higher Regional risk-taking implies a higher Loan spread 
by 14.077 x 0.21 ≈ 3 basis points. According to the summary statistics in Table 2, the average loan 
facility amounts to 255.8 million USD (the inverse log of 19.36) and has an average maturity of 
4.24 years (50.88 / 12 months), which implies that the 3 basis points translate to higher cost of loan 
of a considerable 0.33 million USD for the loan with the average size and maturity (0.0003 × 4.24 
× 255.8 million USD). 
In columns (2) to (5), the coefficient 𝑎1 has even higher economic significance. According 
to column (5) that includes all controls, a one standard deviation higher Regional risk-taking 
implies a higher Loan spread by approximately 3.6 basis points, implying 0.39 million USD higher 
borrower cost. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
 
9 A negative coefficient would also be intuitive, as higher trust by banks might imply lower spreads. This comes down 
to identifying causal effects on the effect of trust, which we leave for future research.   
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 The first potential criticism of our findings is that 𝑎1 captures the effect of other cultural 
traits that are unrelated to economic preferences. In Table 4, we complement the array of control 
variables in equation (1) with Hofstede’s (Panel A) and Schwartz’s (Panel B) measures. Hofstede’s 
power distance load negatively in column 1; however, Regional risk-taking retains its positive and 
significant coefficient. Moreover, Schwartz’s mastery loads positively in Panel B, consistent with 
the idea that societies with individuals seeking success through personal action (possibly at the 
expense of others) tend to take more financial risk. Overall, our findings show that certain cultural 
elements that do not necessarily reflect economic preferences correlate significantly with loan 
spreads; however, the role of economic preferences over risk-taking is still highly relevant in 
explaining financing costs.       
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Our key remedy against omitted-variable bias from unobserved regional characteristics that 
correlate with both Regional risk-taking and financing costs is an IV model. Our idea for the IVs 
comes from a recent macroeconomics literature on the determinants of economic preferences 
(Galor and Özak, 2016). Our premise is that economic risk preferences have begun to shape 
hundreds of years ago in the preindustrial era based on the regional agricultural conditions. 
Specifically, we use as instruments a region’s potential crop yield in calories per hectare per day 
(Regional crop yield) and a region’s potential crop growth cycle in days elapsed from planting to 
full maturity (Regional crop growth cycle).10 We expect that regions with lower crop yield and 
more extensive crop growth cycle will tend to have higher preferences for risk-taking in search for 
alternative (other than agriculture) yield. We focus on the potential (as opposed to actual) crop 
yield and crop growth cycle because these measures are based on agroclimatic constraints in the 
 
10 Galor and Ozak (2016) provide the agricultural data at the regional level, based on WVS regions. Thus, we first 
match the WVS regions to the GPS regions.  
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preindustrial era that, further to being observed in the preindustrial era (and thus being 
predetermined), are largely orthogonal to human intervention, further mitigating endogeneity 
concerns. To this end, our exclusion restriction suggests that Regional crop yield and Regional 
crop growth cycle affect the contemporary financial conditions only via economic preferences. 
Controlling for all economic preferences in both stages of an IV model, we must obtain exogenous 
identification of the impact of economic preferences over risk-taking.  
Table 5 replicates the specifications of Table 3 using two-stage least squares (2SLS). The 
first stage results are consistent with our expectations. We find that Regional crop yield is 
negatively correlated with Regional risk-taking consistent with the hypothesis that higher return to 
agricultural investment is negatively associated with a society’s propensity to take economic risk. 
The opposite holds for Regional crop growth cycle, because a larger crop growth cycle associates 
with more intensive search for alternative sources of yield. Both variables load with strongly 
statistically significant coefficients. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
In turn, the fitted values in the second stage regression are highly statistically significant 
with a somewhat inflated coefficient of 41 basis points according to our preferred specification (5). 
To be conservative, and given that the OLS and 2SLS results almost coincide in terms of statistical 
significance, we base our inferences on the OLS results. In unreported regressions, we also control 
for the Hofstede/ Schwartz variables in the 2SLS model and maintain our inferences.      
We conduct several additional robustness tests on equation 1, using specification (5) of 
Table 3 as benchmark. In the first three columns of Appendix Table A3, we cluster our standard 
errors by region, by region × year, and by country × year. In the last two columns, we additionally 
include country fixed effects, country × year fixed effects, and industry × year fixed effects. 
Especially the country × year fixed effects capture a significant part of potential omitted-variable 
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bias, including general unobserved cultural, societal, and macroeconomic country-year variables. 
Our key results remain largely unaffected.  
In column (1) Table A4, we first drop the financial, utilities, and real estate firms and find 
that our estimates become larger, indicating stronger effects for sectors with larger shares of 
tangible assets. Moreover, dropping the United States from the sample (thus dropping 81% of the 
baseline sample), almost doubles our baseline estimate (column 2 of Table A4). In columns 3 and 
4 of Table A4, we split our sample to terms loans and credit lines (previously we controlled for 
differences via fixed effects). We find statistically significant results in both specifications, but the 
economic significance is much larger on term loans. This is consistent with the premise that credit 
lines provide unique value in solving information problems in lending and thus bear lower credit 
risk (e.g., Berger et al., 2020). Last, our results show that AISU also responds positively to regional 
risk-taking, implying that loan fees further add to the positive effect of Regional risk-taking on the 
total cost of credit.11  
As suggested within the framework of equation (2), an important test to show that regional 
risk-taking affects the terms of borrowing outside the credit market is to also look at the bond 
market. We report the results in Table 6. Consistent with the results in Table 3, we find that higher 
regional risk-taking increases bond spreads. Economically, according to specification 2, a one 
standard deviation higher Regional risk-taking implies a higher Loan spread by 27.464 x 0.20 ≈ 
5.5 basis points. According to the summary statistics in Table 2, the average bond amounts to 361.4 
million USD (the inverse log of 5.89) and has an average maturity of 10.8 years (129.14 / 12 
months), which implies that the 5.5 basis points translate to higher cost of loan of a considerable 
2.15 million USD for the loan with the average size and maturity (0.00055 × 10.8 × 361.4 million 
 
11 All these sensitivity tests are robust to the use of our IV model. 
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USD). Thus, in the bonds market, the economic effect of regional risk-taking on the overall cost of 
financing is even larger.12 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
4. Economic risk-taking and firms’ capital structure 
4.1. Empirical model and data 
According to the traditional theory of capital structure, higher capital costs (including financing 
costs) can lower a firm’s capacity or willingness to take debt. In this section, we thus examine the 
second part of our hypothesis on the effect of regional risk-taking on firms’ capital structure. We 
use the following models: 
 
𝐵𝑜𝑜𝑘 𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑓𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘-𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 + 𝐸𝑃𝑟 + 𝐹𝑓𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓𝑟𝑡.  (3) 
𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔-𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑓𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘-𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 + 𝐸𝑃𝑟 + 𝐹𝑓𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓𝑟𝑡.  (4) 
𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡-𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑓𝑟𝑡 = 𝑎0 + 𝑎1𝑅𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑘-𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑟 + 𝐸𝑃𝑟 + 𝐹𝑓𝑡 + 𝐶𝑡 + 𝑢𝑓𝑟𝑡. (5) 
 
In equation (3), Book leverage is the ratio of the book value of debt to the book value of total assets 
of a firm f in region r in year t. In equations (4) and (5), we use the shares of long-term and short-
term debt to total assets to examine the effect of Regional risk-taking on the time horizon of firms’ 
debt structure. As in equations (1) and (2), the control variables include the rest of the regional 
 
12 Symmetrically with the analysis on syndicated loans, in Table A5 we report the results from several robustness tests 
on equation 2. The results are consistent with those in Table 6.  
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economic preferences variables (EP), along with vectors of firm (F) and country or country-year 
variables. Equation (3) also includes year, industry, and continent fixed effects. Finally, u is the 
stochastic disturbance. 
 We estimate equations (3) to (5) using the Compustat (North America and Global) sample 
of firms, for which we report summary statistics on the right-hand side panel of Table 2. Our most 
restrictive specification includes 238,226 observations from 58 countries and 509 regions. 
Appendix Table A2 reports the numbers of observations, firms, and regions by country.    
For the vector of firm controls we directly follow the extant literature (see e.g., Baker and 
Wurgler, 2002; Graham and Leary, 2011). This literature points to the use of eight key variables, 
including the four variables from Rajan and Zingales (1995) and the four variables from Fama and 
French (2002) that do not overlap. From the eight variables, we exclude the ratio of dividends to 
market value of equity due to the small number of observations, especially for non-US countries. 
We complement this vector with firms’ earnings volatility as in Graham et al. (2015), which we 
find to be a statistically significant control.13 
 
4.2. Empirical identification and results 
The essence of our identification strategy is as in section 4. We begin with OLS results; next we 
show that our results are robust to the inclusion of several macro controls (including culture); 
subsequently, we show IV results; and last we provide many other robustness tests (including 
results with country × year fixed effects).  
Table 7 reports the OLS results. Sequentially adding controls shows the robustness of our 
results to these additions and that our results are not driven by a bad controls problem. All three 
 




specifications show that Regional risk-taking enters with a negative and statistically significant (at 
the 1% level) coefficient. Economically, according to column 4, a one standard deviation higher 
Regional risk-taking (equal to 0.31 in the Compustat sample) yields a 0.0074 (= 0.024 × 0.31) 
decrease in book leverage. This is equivalent to a 1.6% decrease in book leverage for the firm with 
the mean book leverage. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 In Table 8, we report results from the estimation of equations 4 and 5 (in Panels A and B, 
respectively). The results in Panel A show that as we add control variables, the effect of Regional 
risk-taking on Long-term debt becomes less potent. In contrast, the results in Panel B show that 
Regional risk-taking significantly lowers firms’ Short-term debt. Specifically, a one standard 
deviation increase in Regional risk-taking yields an approximately 0.006 (= 0.019 × 0.31) decrease 
in Short-term debt, which is equivalent to a 1.6% decline for the firm with the mean Short-term 
debt. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 Next, in Table 9, we replicate the results of Tables 7 and 8 using the IV model. We use the 
same instruments with the analysis on financing costs, the results of which we report in the lower 
part of Table 9. Again, we find that Regional crop yield is a more significant determinant of 
Regional risk-taking compared to Regional crop growth cycle. We keep both variables as 
exogenous instruments in the first stage for reasons related to our previous theoretical intuition 
(also following Galor and Özak, 2016) and symmetry with our previous analysis.  
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
The second-stage results support the OLS findings. Column 1 reports a significantly lower 
book leverage in regions with higher risk-taking (consistent with the results in Table 7). Column 2 
shows a negative effect of Regional risk-taking on Long-term debt, reflecting more significant 
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results compared to the OLS equivalent (in Panel A of Table 8). Last, column 3 shows a negative 
effect of Regional risk-taking on Short-term debt, consistent with the OLS equivalent (in Panel B 
of Table 8). As in the analysis on financing costs, the IV estimates are larger than the respective 
from the OLS model; to be more conservative, we base our inferences on the OLS estimates.  
 We conduct several additional robustness tests, the results of which we report in Appendix 
Tables A6 to A9. In Tables A6 and A7, we control for the cultural measures by Hofstede and 
Schwartz; we find quantitatively similar results with those in Tables 7 and 8. In Table A8, we use 
additional fixed effects (such as industry × year and continent fixed effects) and/or cluster standard 
errors by region, country × year, or region × year. Again, our results are in line with our baseline. 
Finally, in Table A9, we report results from further robustness tests, where we exclude specific 
sectors (financial, utilities, and real estate firms) or drop the U.S. firms.     
Last, we examine the impact of risk-taking preferences on the speed of adjustment of the 
firm’s target debt ratio, closely following the approach in Flannery and Rangan (2006). To this 
end, we calculate the firm’s market debt ratio as the ratio of the book value of a firm’s total (short 
and long-term) debt to the sum of the book value of total debt plus firm’s market capitalization. 
We employ this variable in year t+1, t+2 or t+3 as dependent variable. To capture the effect of risk-
taking economic preferences on the speed of firm’s target debt ratio adjustment we also include the 
(regional) risk-taking preference measure and its interaction term with the target debt ratio at t. The 
coefficient of this interaction term captures the impact of risk-taking preferences on the speed of 
adjustment. The model is estimated with fixed effects OLS (firm and year) and robust standard 
errors clustered by firm.  
The results are reported in Table 10. The coefficient of the firm’s target debt ratio ranges 
from 0.399 for the 1-year horizon to 0.077 for the 3-year horizon, thus pointing to a speed of 
adjustment of 60.1% towards the target debt ratio in a year, which soars to 92.3% for the 3-year 
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horizon. These results are in line with findings of Flannery and Rangan (2006). More importantly 
though, the coefficients of the interaction term are positive and statistically significant, ranging 
from 0.418 to 0.135 as we move from 1- to 3-year horizons. This implies that in higher risk-taking 
regions the speed of adjustment of target debt ratio significantly increases. This finding, regarding 
the impact of risk-taking preference on capital structure, provides support to the trade-off theory 
explanation.  
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
5. Conclusions and implications 
Our study advances and empirically establishes the hypothesis that regional preferences over 
economic risk-taking work as an endowment that affects firms’ financing costs and capital 
structure. Using different samples on syndicated loans and bonds, we first find that in regions with 
higher risk-taking preferences, both loan spreads and bond spreads are significantly higher. This 
implies that in such regions firms pay higher interest rates on debt. Consistent with this finding and 
key capital structure theories, we next show that firms in regions with high risk-taking preferences 
have lower leverage ratios. Thus, our findings unveil a mechanism through which established 
regional norms and behaviors regarding economic risk-taking affect the pricing of corporate debt 
and by extension capital structure decisions. 
 We contend that our findings have important interrelated implications. First, we show that 
regional economic preferences significantly matter for the determination of loan spreads and this 
has implications for the firms’ capital structure decisions. This naturally opens a discussion of 
whether a relocation decision would be pareto improving for certain firms to benefit from lower 
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lending costs. Surprisingly, in the global sample of firms we use in our analysis, relocation happens 
for only an extremely small number of firms.  
Second, we uncover a new tradeoff in the literature between risk-taking preferences and 
debt. On the one hand, under e.g. the real options theory, a general environment of risk-taking 
preferences is consistent with higher investment and returns in these regions. On the other hand, 
firms in regions with higher risk-taking face higher financing costs and take lower overall leverage, 
which are consistent with lower investment and returns. 
Third, our analysis is in line with previous studies (e.g., Rajan and Zingales, 1995; Graham 
and Leary, 2011; Delis et al., 2020), which suggest that credit costs and capital structure decisions 
are interrelated while their determinants cannot be solely explained by firm-specific characteristics. 
External characteristics matter significantly and explain a big part of the underlying variation in 
credit cost and capital structure. We show that the emergence of novel datasets characterizing 
economic preferences (as opposed to using variables measuring societal culture) is key to 
understanding this variation. On this line, a fruitful avenue for future research should more formally 
consider the potential causal effects of economic patience (long-term orientation) and trust on 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable Source Definition 







Economic risk-taking preferences, calculated at the regional level. 
Regional patience Economic preferences over patience, calculated at the regional level.  
Regional altruism Economic preferences over altruism calculated at the regional level.  
Regional trust Economic preferences over trust calculated at the regional level.  
Panel B. Cultural variables 
Hofstede’s power distance  
 
Lower in hierarchy members of organizations (institutions) accept that power 
is unevenly distributed. Thus, higher values of this measure are related to 
established and accepted hierarchy in society, whereas lower values indicate 
that people question hierarchy and try to distribute power.  
Hofstede’s individualism Peoples’ degree of integration into groups. Higher values points to 
individualism providing emphasis to “I” vs. “we”, whereas lower values 
indicate the opposite, i.e., collectivism.  
Hofstede’s masculinity Societal preferences for values such as, achievement, heroism, material reward 
etc. Higher values indicate a more ‘masculine’ society, whereas lower values 
point to more ‘feminine’ societies where modest and caring views are more 
prevalent. 
Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance Tolerance for uncertainty. Higher values indicate societies that rely more on 
guidelines, laws, codes, and the ‘absolute truth’, whereas lower values point to 
societies with easier acceptance of differing views and ideas, and less 
regulations. 
Hofstede’s long-term orientation Higher values points to more long-term oriented societies in which problem 
solving is viewed as a necessity, whereas lower values relate to societies in 
which traditional values are more prevalent, usually lacking behind in terms of 
economic development. 
Hofstede’s indulgence Freedom of society members to fulfil their human desires. Higher values 
indicate more freedom, whereas lower values point to more strict social norms. 
Schwartz’s harmony  
 
The degree of harmony in societies. Higher values are related to societies where 
people put greater emphasis on the group rather than on the individual. 
Schwartz’s embeddedness The degree of embeddedness in societies. Higher values are to cultural values 
such as tradition, security, obedience. 
Schwartz’s hierarchy The degree of hierarchy in societies. Higher values are related to societies 
where their members accept more their position in hierarchy, are more modest 
and have higher self-control. 
Schwartz’s mastery The degree of mastery in societies. Higher values are related to societies where 
success through personal action is more valued.   
Schwartz’s affective autonomy The degree of affective autonomy in societies. Higher values point to societies 
where their members have more freedom on their choices seeking enjoyment 
by any means without censure. 
Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy The degree of intellectual autonomy in societies. Higher values point to 
societies where their members have more freedom on their independent pursuits 
of ideas and thought. 
Schwartz’s egalitarianism The degree of egalitarianism in societies. Higher values are related to societies 
where their members are valuing more equality and show more concerns for 
others.  
Panel C. Loan-level variables 
Loan spread 
DealScan 
All-in-spread-drawn (in basis points), defined as the sum of the spread over 
LIBOR plus any facility fee. 
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All-in-spread undrawn (AISU) Natural logarithm of the all-in-spread-undrawn, defined as the facility fee and 
the commitment fee on the unused amount of loan commitment. 
Loan amount Natural logarithm of the syndicated loan facility amount (in USD). 
Maturity Loan maturity in months. 
Collateral Dummy equal to 1 for collateralized loans and 0 otherwise. 
Number of lenders Number of banks in a syndicated loan. 
Performance dummy Dummy equal to 1 if the loan has performance pricing provisions and 0 
otherwise. 
Number of general covenants Number of general covenants in a syndicated loan. 
Loan purpose A series of dummy variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, 
debt repay, etc.). 
Loan type A series of dummy variables indicating loan type (e.g., bridge loan, 
revolver/line >= 1 Yr., term loan, etc.). 
Panel D. Bond variables 
Bond spread 
SDC Platinum 
Bond at-issue yield spread is calculated by subtracting the at-issue bond yield 
from the risk-free rate (Treasury yield) issued with comparable maturity at each 
given date. Treasury yields are the monthly Treasury benchmark yields with 
two, three, five, seven, ten, and thirty-year coupon bonds. 
Bond amount Natural logarithm of the issue size of the bond (in million USD).  
Maturity Number of months for bond is issued.  
Coupon  The coupon rate (in %) of the bond.  
Bond rating Bond’s credit rating by Moody’s, transformed into a numerical scale of 1 (Aaa) 
to 21 (C). Authors’ calculations. 
Callability dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is callable before the maturity date and 
0 otherwise.  
Subordinated dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is subordinated, unsecured or without 
collateral and 0 otherwise. 
Private market dummy Dummy variable equal to 1 if the bond is issued in  private market and 0 
otherwise.  
Panel E. Firm-year variables 
Firm book leverage 
Compustat 
Firm’s book value of debt to total assets.  
Firm long-term debt Firm’s long-term debt to total assets.  
Firm short-term debt Firm’s short-term debt to total assets.  
Firm market to book Firm’s market to book ratio.  
Firm EBIT Firm’s earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets.  
Firm long-term debt share Firm’s long-term debt to total liabilities.  
Firm asset tangibility Firm’s property, plant and equipment to total assets.  
Firm EBIT volatility Firm’s EBIT volatility, calculated as a rolling 4-year standard deviation 
estimate. Authors’ calculations. 
Firm interest rate coverage Firm’s earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total interest and related 
expenses.  
Firm capex to sales Firm’s capital expenditures to sales. Capital expenditures are calculated as the 
change in property, plant and equipment from previous year plus depreciation 
and amortization.  
Firm depreciation Firm’s depreciation and amortization to total assets.  
Firm dividend to equity Firm’s common dividends to book value of equity.  
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Firm dividend payout ratio Firm’s common dividends to earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT). 
Firm no research dummy Dummy that takes the value of 1 if the firm does not report research expenses 
or these are zero, and 0 otherwise.  
Firm size Natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets.  
Panel F. Lender-year variables 
Lender book leverage 
Compustat 
Lender’s book value of debt to total assets.  
Lender EBIT Lender’s earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) to total assets.  
Lender liquidity Lender’s cash to total assets.  
Lender deposits Lender’s total deposits to total assets.  
Lender interest expenses Lender’s total interest and related expenses to total assets. 
Panel G. Country-year variables 
Country-year GDP per capita World 
Development 
Indicators 
Natural logarithm of borrower’s country GDP per capita, PPP, in constant 2011 
international $. Source WDI. 
Country-year GPD growth Country-year real GPD growth rate (annual %). Source WDI. 
Country-year crises Laeven and 
Valencia (2020) 
Dummy equal to 1 for the years the country experiences a systemic banking 
crisis and 0 otherwise. 
Country-year loan spread  DealSacn Country-year mean of all-in-spread-drawn. Authors’ calculations. 
Panel H. Exogenous variables 
Regional crop yield  
Galor and Özak 
(2016) 
Regional potential crop yield in the pre-industrial era (before 1500), measured 
in calories per hectare per day, divided by 1,000.  
Regional crop growth cycle Regional potential crop growth cycle in the pre-industrial era (before 1500), 
divided by 1,000. Growth cycle for each crop captures the days elapsed from 





Table 2. Summary statistics 
The table reports basic summary statistics for the three samples employed in the analysis. Definitions for all variables are provided in Table 1. The sample period is 1996-2018. 
 Syndicated loans sample USA Bonds sample Compustat sample 
 Obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev. 
Min. Max. Obs. Mean 
St. 
Dev. 





Loan spread 60,430 189.57 126.15 -200 1,400           
Bond spread      13,275 182.03 175.71 -559 7,300      
Book leverage           238,226 0.47 0.22 0 1 
Firm long-term debt           238,112 0.12 0.14 0 0.97 
Firm short-term debt           238,112 0.37 0.19 0 1 
Explanatory variables 
Regional risk-taking 60,430 0.12 0.21 -1.24 1.45 13,275 0.15 0.20 -1.01 1.45 238,226 0.01 0.31 -1.54 1.98 
Regional patience 60,430 0.80 0.36 -1.78 2.56 13,275 0.85 0.35 -1.78 2.56 238,226 0.50 0.45 -1.78 2.56 
Regional altruism 60,430 0.35 0.30 -1.23 2.03 13,275 0.46 0.28 -0.38 1.99 238,226 0.17 0.42 -1.94 2.03 
Regional trust 60,430 0.11 0.26 -2.31 0.99 13,275 0.10 0.25 -2.31 0.99 238,226 0.02 0.41 -2.40 1.96 
Hofstede’s power distance  60,356 40.84 5.99 11 94      234,265 51.12 15.87 11 94 
Hofstede’s individualism 60,356 87.70 10.23 14 91      234,265 62.48 27.74 12 91 
Hofstede’s masculinity 60,356 61.47 7.61 5 95      234,265 64.92 18.35 5 95 
Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance 60,356 48.32 10.33 29 112      234,265 57.01 22.47 29 112 
Hofstede’s long-term orientation 60,430 31.87 15.13 13 100      236,783 55.36 28.17 4 100 
Hofstede’s indulgence 60,429 65.91 7.69 20 97      235,803 51.55 18.53 0 100 
Schwartz’s harmony  60,399 3.58 0.27 3.28 4.62      235,400 3.83 0.33 3.28 4.62 
Schwartz’s embeddedness 60,399 3.61 0.15 3.03 4.41      235,400 3.60 0.20 3.03 4.45 
Schwartz’s hierarchy 60,399 2.35 0.14 1.60 3.49      235,400 2.57 0.44 1.60 3.49 
Schwartz’s mastery 60,399 4.07 0.08 3.66 4.41      235,400 4.11 0.15 3.66 4.41 
Schwartz’s affective autonomy 60,399 3.91 0.14 2.54 4.39      235,400 3.76 0.28 2.49 4.39 
Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy 60,399 4.29 0.23 3.66 5.13      235,400 4.40 0.31 3.66 5.13 
Schwartz’s egalitarianism 60,399 4.72 0.12 4.23 5.27      235,400 4.59 0.24 4.23 5.27 
Facility amount 60,430 19.36 1.72 3.72 24.62           
Amount      13,275 5.89 1.61 0.22 10.80      
Maturity 60,430 50.88 24.32 1 725 13,275 129.14 111.65 0.10 1,217.7      
Collateral 60,430 0.43 0.49 0 1           
Number of lenders 60,430 10.70 8.93 1 290           
Performance dummy 60,430 0.35 0.48 0 1           
Number of general covenants 60,430 2.60 2.31 0 10           
Coupon rate      13,275 5.56 2.13 0.05 15      
Bond rating      13,275 7.89 3.82 1 19      
Callability dummy      13,275 0.10 0.30 0 1      
Subordinated dummy      13,275 0.16 0.37 0 1      
Private market dummy      13,275 0.10 0.30 0 1      
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Firm book leverage 60,430 0.59 0.18 0 1 13,275 0.68 0.18 0.06 1      
Firm market to book 60,430 2.94 4.63 0 94.19      238,226 2.35 3.85 0 81.97 
Firm EBIT 60,430 0.07 0.09 -5.89 1.70 13,275 0.08 0.04 -0.07 0.20 238,226 0.03 0.21 -7.96 4.31 
Firm long-term debt share 60,430 0.46 0.24 0 0.99           
Firm asset tangibility      13,275 0.32 0.29 0 0.97 238,226 0.30 0.24 0 1 
Firm EBIT volatility      13,275 0.02 0.03 0 0.72 238,226 0.05 0.12 0 3.68 
Firm interest rate coverage      13,275 5.91 9.52 -15.24 179.12      
Firm capex to sales      13,275 0.23 2.38 -4.52 191.33      
Firm depreciation           238,226 0.04 0.03 -0.18 0.51 
Firm dividend to equity           238,226 0.03 0.09 -0.59 2.50 
Firm dividend payout ratio      13,275 0.20 0.54 -16.03 13.30      
Firm no research dummy      13,275 0.71 0.46 0 1 238,226 0.55 0.50 0 1 
Firm size 60,430 8.15 1.87 0.09 23.43 13,275 9.90 1.84 2.07 13.93 238,226 5.84 2.01 0.02 23.45 
Lender book leverage 60,430 0.92 0.03 0.34 1           
Lender EBIT 60,430 0.07 0.03 -0.54 0.21           
Lender liquidity 60,430 0.03 0.03 0 0.29           
Lender deposits 60,430 0.53 0.18 0 0.92           
Lender interest expenses 60,430 0.02 0.01 0 0.12           
Country-year GDP per capita 60,430 10.76 0.22 7.96 10.99      238,226 10.27 0.73 6.99 11.50 
Country-year GPD growth 
60,430 2.40 1.41 -8.07 12.72      238,226 3.20 3.03 -
17.04 
19.68 
Country-year crises 60,430 0.15 0.36 0 1      238,226 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Country-year loan spread 60,430 225.07 50.14 20.68 543.05           
Regional crop yield  60,322 10.87 3.98 0 17.57           




Table 3. Risk-taking preferences and loan spreads: Baseline results 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using the syndicated loans sample. The dependent variable is Loan spread. In all specifications 
the sample includes syndicated loan facilities where the borrower’s country is the same with the lender’s country, whereas as lenders only lead arranger banks are being considered. 
Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS with the fixed effects reported in the lower part of the table and robust standard errors clustered by country. The 
sample period is 1996-2018. The lower part of the table also reports the number of observations, number of clusters, and the adjusted R-squared. The ***, **, and * marks denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional risk-taking 
14.077*** 17.573*** 17.716*** 21.657*** 17.032*** 
(3.10) (3.65) (3.24) (3.69) (5.77) 
Regional patience 
-13.217*** -13.964*** -13.855*** -11.407*** -8.040*** 
(-5.03) (-3.85) (-3.32) (-3.80) (-7.95) 
Regional altruism 
10.631*** 10.529* 9.123* 4.218* 2.372 
(2.94) (1.78) (1.87) (1.99) (1.63) 
Regional trust 
22.915*** 23.317** 22.100** 17.947*** 14.719*** 
(3.83) (2.66) (2.55) (3.42) (4.50) 
Facility amount 
 -18.375*** -11.120** -11.762*** -13.408*** 
 (-5.42) (-2.27) (-3.54) (-5.69) 
Maturity 
 -0.116 -0.068 -0.008 -0.003 
 (-1.31) (-0.81) (-0.14) (-0.04) 
Collateral 
 70.485*** 50.315*** 45.417*** 45.259*** 
 (31.84) (22.83) (32.97) (29.71) 
Number of lenders 
 -0.600*** -0.226 -0.317*** -0.191* 
 (-3.50) (-0.97) (-3.29) (-1.77) 
Performance dummy 
 -35.134*** -27.723*** -26.295*** -26.177*** 
 (-7.09) (-4.86) (-8.27) (-8.41) 
Number of general covenants 
 2.825*** 2.908*** 2.687*** 2.699*** 
 (9.77) (9.12) (13.72) (16.25) 
Firm book leverage 
  93.934*** 89.376*** 85.295*** 
  (16.61) (16.92) (12.66) 
Firm M/B  
  -0.881*** -1.281*** -1.176*** 
  (-5.31) (-11.98) (-6.73) 
Firm EBIT 
  -157.808*** -145.392*** -146.329*** 
  (-10.87) (-14.12) (-13.05) 
Firm long-term debt 
  26.406*** 31.025*** 30.013*** 
  (6.42) (10.68) (13.36) 
Firm size 
  -12.610*** -11.349*** -10.167*** 
  (-3.73) (-5.19) (-7.23) 
Lender book leverage 
   -321.963*** -302.137*** 
   (-6.95) (-6.27) 
Lender EBIT 
   -13.136 -50.231** 
   (-0.28) (-2.69) 
Lender liquidity 
   138.051*** 137.883*** 
   (2.97) (3.17) 
Lender deposits    -42.000*** -48.703*** 
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   (-4.62) (-7.29) 
Lender interest expenses 
   855.516** 530.401*** 
   (2.65) (3.84) 
Country-year GDP per capita 
    -33.742*** 
    (-3.75) 
Country-year GPD growth  
    0.960 
    (0.75) 
Country-year loan spread 
    0.561*** 
    (9.18) 
Country-year crises  
    13.296 
    (1.51) 
Constant 
203.077*** 541.061*** 445.310*** 747.128*** 994.655*** 
(89.11) (7.63) (5.90) (10.15) (7.34) 
Observations 100,670 98,527 71,795 60,430 60,430 
No of clusters 44 44 44 34 34 
Industry, Loan purpose, Loan type, Continent, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country 
Adj-R2 0.36 0.48 0.51 0.53 0.55 
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Table 4. Risk-taking preferences and loan spreads: Controlling for culture 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using the syndicated loans sample. The 
dependent variable is Loan spread. In all specifications the sample includes syndicated loan facilities where the borrower’s country 
is the same with the lender’s country, whereas as lenders only lead arranger banks are being considered. Definitions for all variables 
are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS with the fixed effects reported in the lower part of the table and robust standard errors 
clustered by country. The sample period is 1996-2018. The lower part of the table also reports the number of observations, number 
of clusters, and the adjusted R-squared. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Panel A. Hofstede’s cultural dimension measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Regional risk-taking 
15.978*** 16.710*** 16.323*** 15.827*** 17.426*** 16.342***  
(6.41) (5.85) (6.14) (6.50) (5.48) (6.54)  
Regional patience 
-8.207*** -7.835*** -7.906*** -8.016*** -8.424*** -7.921***  
(-8.87) (-7.32) (-7.49) (-8.78) (-8.05) (-7.73)  
Regional altruism 
2.045 2.665* 2.738* 2.027 2.524* 2.480*  
(1.46) (1.86) (2.02) (1.47) (1.85) (1.77)  
Regional trust 
13.460*** 14.607*** 14.260*** 13.551*** 15.256*** 13.946***  
(5.73) (4.47) (4.50) (5.32) (4.23) (5.25)  
Hofstede’s power distance  -0.455**       
(-2.64)       
Hofstede’s individualism  -0.187      
 (-0.84)      
Hofstede’s masculinity   -0.111     
  (-0.65)     
Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance    -0.223    
   (-1.62)    
Hofstede’s long-term orientation     0.305   
    (1.29)   
Hofstede’s indulgence      0.246  
     (1.50)  
Observations 60,356 60,356 60,356 60,356 60,430 60,429  
No of clusters 31 31 31 31 34 33  
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry, Loan purpose, Loan type,  
Continent, Year FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country  
Adj-R2 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55  
Panel B. Schwartz’s cultural value orientation scores 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Regional risk-taking 
16.504*** 16.594*** 16.581*** 15.291*** 16.508*** 16.337*** 16.692*** 
(5.87) (5.89) (5.89) (6.97) (6.10) (5.89) (5.84) 
Regional patience 
-7.866*** -8.022*** -7.908*** -7.780*** -7.830*** -7.823*** -7.852*** 
(-7.63) (-7.52) (-7.70) (-8.30) (-7.52) (-7.67) (-7.52) 
Regional altruism 
2.478* 2.700** 2.598* 1.681 2.402* 2.172** 2.480* 
(1.93) (2.21) (1.97) (1.23) (1.73) (2.13) (1.72) 
Regional trust 
14.523*** 14.655*** 14.488*** 12.644*** 14.468*** 14.286*** 14.511*** 
(4.32) (4.42) (4.62) (6.67) (4.59) (4.44) (4.57) 
Schwartz’s harmony  0.669       
(0.06)       
Schwartz’s embeddedness  -13.054      
 (-0.53)      
Schwartz’s hierarchy   -6.400     
  (-0.42)     
Schwartz’s mastery    64.118***    
   (2.88)    
Schwartz’s affective autonomy     -3.651   
    (-0.24)   
Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy      -6.736  
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     (-0.34)  
Schwartz’s egalitarianism       23.858 
      (0.88) 
Observations 60,399 60,399 60,399 60,399 60,399 60,399 60,399 
No of clusters 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, Loan purpose, Loan type,  
Continent, Year FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 





Table 5. Risk-taking preferences and loan spreads: IV results 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from IV estimations using the syndicated loans 
sample. The five specifications replicate those in Table 3. The dependent variable in second stage regression is Loan 
spread. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is IV with the fixed effects reported in the 
lower part of the table and robust standard errors clustered by country. In all specifications the sample includes 
syndicated loan facilities where the borrower’s country is the same with the lender’s country, whereas only lead 
arrangers are being considered. The bottom part of the table also reports the number of observations and number of 
clusters. The sample period is 1996-2018. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional risk-taking 
74.293*** 41.885** 59.329** 58.480** 41.389*** 
(3.432) (2.562) (1.966) (2.332) (3.185) 
Regional patience 
-27.939*** -19.237*** -23.333** -20.641*** -14.130*** 
(-4.089) (-3.159) (-2.458) (-2.722) (-5.112) 
Regional altruism 
2.755 6.227 2.430 -1.231 -1.213 
(0.975) (1.570) (0.804) (-0.558) (-0.545) 
Regional trust 
21.561*** 20.342*** 19.151*** 18.330*** 14.977*** 
(3.994) (2.954) (2.748) (4.258) (5.528) 
First stage      
Regional crop yield  -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (-6.057) (-6.171) (-4.755) (-10.703) (-10.973) 
Regional crop growth cycle 0.003** 0.003** 0.002* 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (1.998) (1.999) (1.741) (3.662) (3.704) 
Observations 100,308 98,166 71,487 60,325 60,325 
No of clusters 43 43 43 33 33 
Controls as in Table 3 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, Loan purpose, Loan type, 
Continent, Year FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 









Table 6. Risk-taking preferences and bond spreads: Baseline results 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using 
the USA bonds sample. The dependent variable is Bond spread. Definitions for all variables 
are in Table 1. Bond rating residuals is the residuals from a first stage regression where bond’s 
credit rating is regressed on regional risk-taking (for more information, see the main text). 
Estimation method is OLS with the fixed effects reported in the lower part of the table and 
robust standard errors clustered by state. The sample period is 1996-2018. The lower part of 
the table also reports the number of observations, number of clusters, and the adjusted R-
squared. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 































Private market dummy 
10.926*** 11.638*** 
(5.30) (4.76) 






Firm asset tangibility 
 7.827 
 (1.17) 
Firm EBIT volatility 
 108.055*** 
 (2.99) 
Firm interest coverage ratio 
 0.312* 
 (1.84) 
Firm capex ratio 
 -0.346*** 
 (-3.42) 
Firm dividend payout ratio 
 0.639 
 (0.69) 









Observations 22,438 13,275 
No of clusters 51 49 
Industry, US interstate division, Year FE Yes Yes 
Clustering State State 
Adj-R2 0.84 0.77 
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Table 7. Risk-taking preferences and Firm book leverage 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using the 
Compustat sample. The dependent variable is Firm book leverage. Definitions for all variables 
are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS with the fixed effects reported in the lower part of the 
table and robust standard errors clustered by country. The sample period is 1996-2018. The lower 
part of the table also reports the number of observations, number of clusters, and the adjusted R-
squared. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.035*** -0.021*** -0.024*** 
(-4.38) (-3.00) (-3.71) 
Regional patience 
0.018** 0.008 0.017** 
(2.05) (1.06) (2.52) 
Regional altruism 
0.013 0.007 0.009 
(1.30) (0.69) (0.92) 
Regional trust 
-0.037*** -0.036*** -0.039*** 
(-4.50) (-5.29) (-3.13) 
Firm M/B  
 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (4.56) (4.37) 
Firm EBIT 
 -0.153*** -0.157*** 
 (-4.49) (-4.49) 
Firm asset tangibility 
 0.010 0.010 
 (0.41) (0.41) 
Firm EBIT volatility 
 -0.136** -0.137** 
 (-2.48) (-2.49) 
Firm depreciation 
 0.536*** 0.541*** 
 (4.67) (4.80) 
Firm dividend to equity 
 0.168*** 0.164*** 
 (4.83) (4.93) 
Firm no research dummy 
 0.027*** 0.025*** 
 (7.72) (4.25) 
Firm size 
 0.029*** 0.030*** 
 (9.98) (11.15) 
Country-year GDP per capita 
  -0.027 
  (-1.57) 
Country-year GPD growth  
  -0.004** 
  (-2.03) 
Country-year crises 
  0.011 
  (1.14) 
Constant 
0.469*** 0.254*** 0.532*** 
(76.47) (10.27) (2.90) 
Observations 560,742 238,248 238,226 
No of clusters 58 58 58 
Industry, Continent, Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Country Country Country 





Table 8. Risk-taking preferences and Firm long-term debt and Firm short-term debt 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using the Compustat 
sample. The dependent variable is Firm long-term debt  in Panel A and Firm short-term debt in Panel B. 
Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS with the fixed effects reported in the 
lower part of the table and robust standard errors clustered by country. The sample period is 1996-2018. The 
lower part of the table also reports the number of observations, number of clusters, and the adjusted R-squared. 
The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Panel A. Dependent variable is Firm long-term debt 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.014** -0.005 -0.007 
(-2.07) (-1.01) (-1.30) 
Regional patience 
0.012* 0.004 0.011 
(1.93) (0.77) (1.39) 
Regional altruism 
-0.010 -0.005 -0.003 
(-1.30) (-0.81) (-0.55) 
Regional trust 
-0.023*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
(-3.53) (-3.68) (-2.72) 
Observations 579,187 238,134 238,112 
No of clusters 58 58 58 
Control variables No +Firm-year +Counrtry-year 
Industry, Continent, Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Country Country Country 
Adj-R2 0.17 0.30 0.30 
Panel B. Dependent variable is Firm short term-debt 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.023*** -0.017*** -0.019*** 
(-2.95) (-3.17) (-3.09) 
Regional patience 
0.009 0.007 0.010 
(1.16) (1.10) (1.55) 
Regional altruism 
0.019** 0.010 0.010 
(2.39) (1.16) (1.14) 
Regional trust 
-0.017 -0.021*** -0.023*** 
(-1.61) (-2.99) (-2.73) 
Observations 219,764 219,764 219,764 
No of clusters 498 498 498 
Control variables No +Firm-year +Counrtry-year 
Industry, Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Region Region Region 





Table 9. Risk-taking preferences and capital structure: IV results 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from IV estimations using 
the Compustat sample. The dependent variable of the second stage regression is Firm book 
leverage, Firm long-term debt, and Firm short-term debt in columns 1 to 3, respectively. 
Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. The lower part of the table reports the first stage results 
on the exogenous instruments, the number of observations, the number of clusters and the 
included fixed effects. For brevity, only the coefficients of interest are reported from second stage 
regressions. The sample period is 1996-2018. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.222** -0.101* -0.139** 
(-2.111) (-1.845) (-1.990) 
Regional patience 
0.064** 0.027 0.042** 
(2.149) (1.499) (2.477) 
Regional altruism 
-0.015 -0.003 -0.016 
(-0.505) (-0.222) (-0.811) 
Regional trust 
-0.017 -0.011* -0.009 
(-1.269) (-1.754) (-0.823) 
First stage     
Regional crop yield   
-0.002** -0.002** -0.002** 
(-2.293) (-2.254) (-2.315) 
Regional crop growth cycle 
0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
(1.829) (1.742) (1.866) 
Observations 202,312 202,312 202,312 
No of clusters 58 58 58 
Industry, Continent, Year FE Yes Yes Yes 




Table 10. Risk-taking preferences and speed of firm’s target leverage adjustment 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using the 
Compustat sample. The dependent variable is Firm market debt ratio at t+1, t+2 and t+3 in columns 
(1), (2) and (3), respectively, defined as the ratio of book value of firm’s total (short and long-term) 
debt to the sum of the book value of total debt plus firm’s market capitalization. Definitions for the 
control variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS with the fixed effects reported in the lower 
part of the table and robust standard errors clustered by firm. The sample period is 1996-2018. The 
lower part of the table also reports the number of observations, number of clusters, and the adjusted R-
squared. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Firm market debt ratio 
0.399*** 0.189*** 0.077*** 
(54.74) (25.60) (12.40) 
Firm market debt ratio x Regional risk-taking 
0.418*** 0.221*** 0.135*** 
(15.74) (7.84) (6.15) 
Firm M/B  
-0.0003*** -0.0004*** -0.0001** 
(-6.43) (-6.93) (-2.46) 
Firm EBIT 
-0.007*** -0.005*** -0.003** 
(-6.73) (-3.99) (-1.98) 
Firm depreciation   
0.036*** -0.004 -0.012 
(4.01) (-0.38) (-1.06) 
Firm asset tangibility 
0.017*** 0.013*** 0.007*** 
(9.18) (5.66) (2.98) 
Firm research expenses to assets 
-0.001 -0.006 -0.003 
(-0.98) (-1.54) (-1.11) 
Firm no research dummy 
0.001** 0.001** 0.001 
(2.55) (2.08) (1.05) 
Firm size 
0.007*** 0.009*** 0.009*** 
(17.00) (16.29) (15.40) 
Industry-year median of market debt ratio 
0.010 -0.011 -0.027* 
(1.04) (-0.85) (-1.95) 
Country-year GDP per capita 
-0.012*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 
(-11.82) (-12.25) (-10.11) 
Country-year GPD growth  
0.0003*** -0.0002** 0.0005*** 
(4.97) (-2.45) (6.17) 
Country-year crises 
0.011*** 0.002** 0.001 
(15.27) (2.37) (0.95) 
Constant 
0.127*** 0.188*** 0.183*** 
(13.50) (15.24) (13.31) 
Observations 350,238 310,194 274,944 
No of clusters 36,744 33,502 30,545 
Firm, Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Firm Firm Firm 





This appendix, intended for online use only, provides details for the samples used in our empirical analysis, 





Table A1. List of additional country-year control variables 
The table provides a list of more than 100 control variables, which we use in additional regressions. We do not report the results from these 
regressions, but the effect of Regional risk-taking is similar or higher compared to that in our baseline regressions. In many respects, we use 
more than one variable (i.e. from a different source) for the same country-year characteristic (e.g., corruption). Abbreviation of sources: ICRG: 
International Country Risk Guide; FH: Freedom House; WB: World Bank (either World Development Indicators or Quality of Governance 
indices); HF: Heritage Foundation; SWIID: Standardized World Income Inequality Database; GFDD: Global Financial Development 
Database. Many of the variables below are % of GDP. 
 Variable Source Variable Source 
Corruption ICRG, FH, WB, HF Bank accounts (per 1,000 people) GFDD 
Rule of law ICRG, FH, WB, HF Bank branches (per 1,000 people) GFDD 
Government quality ICRG, FH, WB Corporate bonds to total bonds GFDD 
Ethnic fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) Private credit by banks GFDD 
Language fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) Domestic credit to private sector GFDD 
Religion fractionalization Alesina et al. (2003) Outstanding public debt to securities GFDD 
Population size WB Syndicated loan issuance volume Own calculations 
Population density WB Syndicated loan average maturity Own calculations 
Population growth WB Bank net interest margin GFDD 
Urban population WB Bank lending-deposit spread GFDD 
Political terror US state department Bank return on assets GFDD 
Armed forces WB Bank cost to income ratio GFDD 
Military expenditure WB Foreign bank ownership Claessens and Van Horen (2014) 
Average schooling (years) Barro and Lee (2013) Bank Z-score GFDD 
Average schooling (male and female) Barro and Lee (2013) Bank non-performing loans ratio  GFDD 
Government education expenditure UNESCO Banking industry H-statistic GFDD 
Age dependency (% of labor) WB Bank Lerner index Delis et al. (2015), GFDD 
Agriculture value added WB Boone indicator Delis et al. (2015), GFDD 
Birth rate (per 1,000 people) WB Remittance inflows GFDD 
CO2 emissions WB Banking crisis dummy GFDD 
Death rate (per 1,00 people) WB Consumer price index GFDD 
DEC alternative conversion factor WB Capital stringency Barth et al. (2013) 
External balance on goods & services WB Bank activity restrictions Barth et al. (2013) 
Electric power consumption WB Official bank supervisory powers Barth et al. (2013) 
Various employment ratios WB, IMF Bank private monitoring  Barth et al. (2013) 
Consumption expenditure WB Bank external governance Barth et al. (2013) 
Foreign direct investment inflows WB Bank deposit insurance Barth et al. (2013) 
Fertility rate WB Bank entry requirements Barth et al. (2013) 
Forest area WB Corporate tax rates WB, OECD, Tax foundation 
Gini coefficient  SWIID Business freedom HF 
Lending interest rate WB Labor freedom HF 
Deposit interest rate WB Trade freedom HF 
Arable land WB Investment freedom HF 
Life expectancy at birth WB Financial freedom HF 
Mobile subscriptions WB Tax burden HF 
Infant mortality WB Government spending HF, WB 
Official exchange rate WB Fiscal health HF 
Country size WB Fiscal deficit WB 
Longitude G-Econ project Fiscal debt WB 
Terrain roughness G-Econ project Monetary freedom HF 
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Table A2. Samples details 
Sample period for all three samples is 1996-2018. 
  Syndicated loans sample details Compustat sample details USA bonds sample details 


















1 Argentina      237 0.1 4 50 1 Alabama 105 0.79 13 
2 Australia 1,193 1.97 8 92 26 5,425 2.28 13 810 2 Alaska 1 0.01 1 
3 Austria 6 0.01 2 4 1 679 0.29 9 90 3 Arizona 87 0.66 25 
4 Bangladesh      367 0.15 2 97 4 Arkansas 108 0.81 12 
5 Botswana      43 0.02 1 9 5 California 893 6.73 142 
6 Brazil 20 0.03 3 8 2 1,697 0.71 15 251 6 Colorado 188 1.42 55 
7 Canada 1,391 2.3 8 241 21 17,579 7.38 8 2,596 7 Connecticut 845 6.37 50 
8 Chile      227 0.1 8 94 8 Delaware 70 0.53 10 
9 China 13 0.02 5 7 4 27,634 11.6 24 3,357 9 D. of Columbia 253 1.91 10 
10 Colombia      80 0.03 6 25 10 Florida 528 3.98 84 
11 Czech Republic 5 0.01 2 2 2 28 0.01 4 11 11 Georgia 414 3.12 68 
12 Egypt      92 0.04 5 36 12 Hawaii 21 0.16 1 
13 Estonia      112 0.05 2 18 13 Idaho 29 0.22 7 
14 Finland 51 0.08 1 21 4 1,493 0.63 4 159 14 Illinois 818 6.16 117 
15 France 1,397 2.31 12 161 12 2,332 0.98 21 549 15 Indiana 164 1.24 26 
16 Germany 1,419 2.35 12 126 18 3,933 1.65 13 572 16 Iowa 78 0.59 9 
17 Ghana      42 0.02 3 10 17 Kansas 26 0.2 9 
18 Greece 23 0.04 1 9 4 710 0.3 6 158 18 Kentucky 64 0.48 17 
19 Hungary 12 0.02 1 3 3 98 0.04 4 19 19 Louisiana 80 0.6 23 
20 India 261 0.43 8 66 20 11,849 4.97 20 1,769 20 Maine 3 0.02 2 
21 Indonesia 7 0.01 1 3 2 655 0.27 7 186 21 Maryland 96 0.72 25 
22 Israel 1 0 1 1 1 980 0.41 6 218 22 Massachusetts 275 2.07 51 
23 Italy 131 0.22 4 23 8 1,528 0.64 16 293 23 Michigan 676 5.09 52 
24 Japan 980 1.62 6 171 20 46,406 19.48 10 3,599 24 Minnesota 216 1.63 34 
25 Jordan      130 0.05 3 41 25 Mississippi 13 0.1 2 
26 Kazakhstan      7 0 3 3 26 Missouri 237 1.79 43 
27 Kenya      224 0.09 3 32 27 Nebraska 137 1.03 13 
28 Lithuania      79 0.03 8 20 28 Nevada 256 1.93 29 
29 Malawi      13 0.01 1 2 29 New Hampshire 11 0.08 6 
30 Mexico 24 0.04 4 9 4 315 0.13 7 80 30 New Jersey 437 3.29 55 
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31 Morocco      203 0.09 7 43 31 New Mexico 19 0.14 4 
32 Netherlands 436 0.72 8 72 8 1,376 0.58 10 184 32 New York 1,650 12.43 135 
33 Nigeria 2 0 1 1 1 379 0.16 11 65 33 North Carolina 293 2.21 55 
34 Pakistan      1,468 0.62 4 211 34 North Dakota 4 0.03 1 
35 Peru 3 0 1 1 1 119 0.05 4 46 35 Ohio 489 3.68 99 
36 Philippines 1 0 1 1 1 721 0.3 2 120 36 Oklahoma 172 1.3 32 
37 Poland 32 0.05 2 6 4 373 0.16 15 140 37 Oregon 83 0.63 12 
38 Portugal 28 0.05 2 7 3 290 0.12 3 47 38 Pennsylvania 431 3.25 77 
39 Romania      136 0.06 27 44 39 Rhode Island 84 0.63 7 
40 Russia 14 0.02 3 9 5 243 0.1 15 78 40 South Carolina 16 0.12 5 
41 Saudi Arabia 31 0.05 3 8 3 458 0.19 8 85 41 South Dakota 14 0.11 5 
42 South Africa 41 0.07 3 11 4 1,316 0.55 7 224 42 Tennessee 362 2.73 36 
43 South Korea 288 0.48 5 36 14 11,335 4.76 15 1,494 43 Texas 1,722 12.97 327 
44 Spain 275 0.46 7 52 4 1,001 0.42 13 148 44 Utah 40 0.3 10 
45 Sri Lanka      954 0.4 4 155 45 Vermont 3 0.02 1 
46 Sweden 89 0.15 7 33 2 3,385 1.42 8 430 46 Virginia 439 3.31 59 
47 Switzerland 207 0.34 5 32 6 1,420 0.6 6 149 47 Washington 185 1.39 26 
48 Tanzania      35 0.01 1 4 48 West Virginia 10 0.08 3 
49 Thailand 11 0.02 2 4 2 1,913 0.8 15 419 49 Wisconsin 130 0.98 36 
50 Turkey 36 0.06 1 5 6 307 0.13 9 84      
51 Uganda      15 0.01 1 3      
52 Ukraine      6 0 3 4      
53 United Arab 
Emirates 
     202 0.08 6 33 
     
54 United Kingdom 3,157 5.22 12 397 31 11,200 4.7 12 1,480      
55 United States 48,845 80.83 50 6,088 399 74,226 31.16 51 9,676      
56 Venezuela      1 0 1 1      
57 Vietnam      105 0.04 13 74      
58 Zimbabwe      45 0.02 2 14      
 Total 60,430 100 192 7,710 646 238,226 100 509 30,609   13,275 100 1,921 
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Table A3. Risk-taking preferences and loan spreads: More fixed effects and alternative clustering 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) when including various fixed effects and employing 
alternative clustering using the syndicated loans sample. In all specifications the sample includes syndicated loan facilities 
where the borrower’s country is the same with the lender’s country, whereas as lenders only lead arranger banks are being 
considered. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS. The sample period is 1996-2018. The 
***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional risk-taking 
17.032*** 16.899*** 17.032*** 15.839*** 16.306*** 
(2.82) (4.51) (5.72) (8.12) (9.42) 
Regional patience 
-8.040*** -7.810*** -8.040*** -8.279*** -8.554*** 
(-2.70) (-3.39) (-3.68) (-8.98) (-13.27) 
Regional altruism 
2.372 2.085 2.372 2.052** 0.553 
(0.56) (0.76) (0.81) (2.65) (0.98) 
Regional trust 
14.719*** 14.640*** 14.719*** 10.911*** 10.200*** 
(3.58) (4.88) (5.81) (8.47) (15.05) 
Observations 60,430 60,427 60,430 60,428 60,313 
No of clusters 192 2,033 396 32 31 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
FE 




Loan type, loan 
purpose, industry, 
continent x year, 
year 








Loan type, loan 
purpose, 
industry x year, 
country x year 






Table A4. Risk-taking preferences and loan spreads: Additional robustness tests 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using the syndicated loans 
sample. The dependent variable is Loan spread unless otherwise specified. In all specifications the sample includes 
syndicated loan facilities where the borrower’s country is the same with the lender’s country, whereas as lenders only 
lead arranger banks are being considered. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is OL unless 
otherwise specified with the fixed effects reported in the lower part of the table and robust standard errors clustered by 
country. The sample period is 1996-2018. The lower part of the table also reports the number of observations, number 
of clusters, and the adjusted R-squared. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 


















23.469*** 33.807** 27.460*** 8.108*** 2.159*** 
(8.28) (2.56) (7.18) (4.53) (3.35) 
Regional patience 
-8.818*** -5.639 -10.359*** -6.479*** -1.327* 
(-9.49) (-0.48) (-6.12) (-7.00) (-2.03) 
Regional altruism 
1.018 -3.477 1.754 3.463* 0.344 
(0.62) (-0.33) (0.87) (1.98) (0.43) 
Regional trust 
16.650*** 6.659 15.395*** 11.841*** 4.164** 
(5.09) (0.66) (3.20) (8.07) (2.52) 
Observations 50,562 11,580 19,608 33,803 26,834 
No of clusters 34 33 34 26 25 
Contol variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, Loan purpose, Loan 
type, Continent, Year FE 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country 







Table A5. Risk-taking preferences and bond spreads: Robustness tests 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from robustness tests estimations for Column IV in 
Table 6 using the USA bonds sample. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS. The sample 
period is 1996-2018. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Adding fixed effects and employing alternative clustering   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Regional risk-taking 
27.464*** 20.262*** 24.309** 24.309*** 23.427*** 
(3.87) (3.36) (2.68) (3.46) (2.95) 
Regional patience 
-5.135 -4.552 -3.103 -3.103 -3.593 
(-1.15) (-1.29) (-0.71) (-1.02) (-1.05) 
Regional altruism 
-2.240 -0.680 0.854 0.854 1.849 
(-0.40) (-0.17) (0.18) (0.21) (0.40) 
Regional trust 
-7.290 -0.075 -5.467 -5.467 -5.382 
(-0.86) (-0.02) (-0.67) (-0.95) (-0.73) 
Observations 13,275 13,284 13,078 13,078 13,078 










Industry x year, 
US interstate 
division, year 
Industry x year, 
US interstate 







division x year 
State x year 
Other robustness tests 
 (1) (2) 
 
Excluding obs. for financial, utilities and 
real estate firms 
Weighted least squares, 




















Table A6. Risk-taking preferences and Firm book leverage: Robustness tests 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using the Compustat sample. The 
dependent variable is Firm book leverage. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS with the fixed 
effects reported in the lower part of the table and robust standard errors clustered by country. The sample period is 1996-2018. 
The lower part of the table also reports the number of observations, number of clusters, and the adjusted R-squared. The ***, **, 
and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Hofstede’s cultural measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Regional risk-taking 
-0.023*** -0.017** -0.026*** -0.018** -0.025*** -0.025***  
(-3.14) (-2.17) (-4.05) (-2.36) (-3.22) (-3.96)  
Regional patience 
0.010* 0.008 0.015** 0.020** 0.018** 0.017**  
(1.69) (1.30) (2.13) (2.29) (2.30) (2.50)  
Regional altruism 
0.013 0.013 0.008 0.010 0.012 0.008  
(1.38) (1.43) (1.03) (1.09) (1.34) (1.09)  
Regional trust 
-0.037*** -0.030** -0.041*** -0.034** -0.040*** -0.040***  
(-2.76) (-2.31) (-2.94) (-2.35) (-2.93) (-3.12)  
Hofstede’s power distance  -0.002*       
(-1.99)       
Hofstede’s individualism  0.001      
 (1.47)      
Hofstede’s masculinity   -0.000*     
  (-1.78)     
Hofstede’s uncertainty avoidance    0.001    
   (1.13)    
Hofstede’s long-term orientation     -0.001   
    (-0.96)   
Hofstede’s indulgence      -0.000  
     (-0.87)  
Observations 234,265 234,265 234,265 234,265 236,783 235,803  
No of clusters 42 42 42 42 52 51  
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country  
Adj-R2 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30 0.30  
Panel B. Schwartz’s cultural measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.028*** -0.025*** -0.018** -0.021** -0.022*** -0.027*** -0.025*** 
(-4.26) (-3.78) (-2.14) (-2.56) (-2.92) (-4.15) (-4.18) 
Regional patience 
0.015** 0.018** 0.014** 0.017** 0.013** 0.017** 0.017** 
(2.04) (2.25) (2.39) (2.18) (2.21) (2.20) (2.55) 
Regional altruism 
0.004 0.007 0.015 0.011 0.011 0.004 0.009 
(0.55) (0.77) (1.64) (1.21) (1.35) (0.60) (1.14) 
Regional trust 
-0.041*** -0.039*** -0.033** -0.038** -0.038*** -0.040*** -0.034*** 
(-3.00) (-2.85) (-2.33) (-2.52) (-2.79) (-2.95) (-2.73) 
Schwartz’s harmony  -0.038*       
(-1.82)       
Schwartz’s embeddedness  0.056      
 (1.50)      
Schwartz’s hierarchy   -0.063*     
  (-2.01)     
Schwartz’s mastery    -0.061    
   (-0.83)    
Schwartz’s affective autonomy     0.031   
    (0.83)   
Schwartz’s intellectual autonomy      -0.038*  
     (-1.79)  
Schwartz’s egalitarianism       0.171*** 
      (2.97) 
Observations 235,400 235,400 235,400 235,400 235,400 235,400 235,400 
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No of clusters 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 






Table A7. Risk-taking preferences and Firm short-term debt 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from estimations using the Compustat sample. The 
dependent variable is Firm short-term debt. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is OLS with the fixed 
effects reported in the lower part of the table and robust standard errors clustered by country. The sample period is 1996-2018. 
The lower part of the table also reports the number of observations, number of clusters, and the adjusted R-squared. The ***, **, 
and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
Panel A. Hofstede’s cultural measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
Regional risk-taking 
-0.016** -0.015** -0.017*** -0.012* -0.017*** -0.018***  
(-2.36) (-2.51) (-3.37) (-1.87) (-2.85) (-2.74)  
Regional patience 
0.006 0.009 0.009 0.014 0.008 0.011  
(1.06) (1.29) (1.18) (1.66) (1.53) (1.57)  
Regional altruism 
0.011 0.009 0.009 0.010 0.007 0.006  
(1.32) (1.24) (1.16) (1.35) (1.01) (0.95)  
Regional trust 
-0.021** -0.022** -0.023** -0.017* -0.023*** -0.022***  
(-2.46) (-2.32) (-2.61) (-1.96) (-3.13) (-2.93)  
Hofstede’s power distance  -0.001       
(-1.03)       
Hofstede’s individualism  -0.000      
 (-0.05)      
Hofstede’s masculinity   -0.000     
  (-0.66)     
Hofstede’s uncertainty 
avoidance 
   0.001**    
   (2.28)    
Hofstede’s long-term orientation     0.001*   
    (1.84)   
Hofstede’s indulgence      -0.001*  
     (-1.83)  
Observations 234,151 234,151 234,151 234,151 236,669 235,689  
No of clusters 42 42 42 42 52 51  
Control variables  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Industry, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country  
Adj-R2 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.34  
Panel B. Schwartz’s cultural measures 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.016*** -0.015** -0.013* -0.016** -0.016** -0.016*** -0.018*** 
(-2.92) (-2.45) (-2.00) (-2.30) (-2.43) (-3.15) (-3.10) 
Regional patience 
0.008 0.007 0.007 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
(1.16) (1.21) (1.24) (1.13) (1.24) (1.24) (1.48) 
Regional altruism 
0.008 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 
(1.09) (1.04) (1.45) (1.04) (1.11) (1.19) (1.20) 
Regional trust 
-0.021** -0.021*** -0.017** -0.021** -0.021** -0.021** -0.017** 
(-2.59) (-2.69) (-2.16) (-2.43) (-2.48) (-2.59) (-2.50) 
Schwartz’s harmony  -0.001       
(-0.05)       
Schwartz’s embeddedness  -0.020      
 (-0.64)      
Schwartz’s hierarchy   -0.040*     
  (-1.99)     
Schwartz’s mastery    -0.002    
   (-0.03)    
Schwartz’s affective autonomy     -0.005   
    (-0.20)   
Schwartz’s intellectual 
autonomy 
     0.004  
     (0.16)  
Schwartz’s egalitarianism       0.121*** 
      (2.99) 
Observations 235,286 235,286 235,286 235,286 235,286 235,286 235,286 
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No of clusters 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry, Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Clustering Country Country Country Country Country Country Country 





Table A8. Risk-taking preferences and capital structure: More fixed effects and alternative clustering 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from robustness tests estimations for Column I in 
Table 7 and Column I inTable 8, Panel B using the Compustat sample. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation 
method is OLS. The sample period is 1996-2018. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable is Firm book leverage 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.024** -0.024*** -0.024*** -0.024*** 
(-2.44) (-3.62) (-9.98) (-7.46) 
Regional patience 
0.017* 0.017** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
(1.83) (2.52) (6.81) (5.78) 
Regional altruism 
0.009 0.009 0.009*** 0.009*** 
(1.12) (0.96) (2.88) (3.55) 
Regional trust 
-0.039*** -0.038*** -0.039*** -0.038*** 
(-4.58) (-2.97) (-8.70) (-13.85) 
Dependent variable is Firm short-term debt 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.019** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 
(-2.31) (-3.06) (-9.30) (-7.16) 
Regional patience 
0.010* 0.010 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(1.91) (1.55) (4.94) (5.00) 
Regional altruism 
0.010* 0.010 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(1.86) (1.22) (3.74) (5.23) 
Regional trust 
-0.023*** -0.023** -0.023*** -0.023*** 
(-3.78) (-2.63) (-7.41) (-10.77) 
Obs. 238,112 238,103 238,112 238,103 








Industry x year, 
year, continent 






Table A9. Risk-taking preferences and capital structure: Additional 
robustness tests 
The table reports coefficient estimates and t-statistics (in parentheses) from robustness 
tests estimations for Column I in Table 7 and Column I in Table 8, Panel B using the 
Compustat sample. Definitions for all variables are in Table 1. Estimation method is 
OLS with robust standard errors clustered by country . The sample period is 1996-
2018. The ***, **, and * marks denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% 
levels, respectively. 
 (1) (3) 
 Excluding  financial, 
utilities and real estate 
firms 
Dropping U.S. firms 
(~31% of the sample) 













Dependent variable is Short term debt to assets 
Regional risk-taking 
-0.025* -0.019** 
(-1.90) (-2.64) 
Regional patience 
0.014 0.015 
(1.43) (1.54) 
Regional altruism 
0.035*** 0.018 
(3.41) (1.49) 
Regional trust 
-0.042** -0.034*** 
(-2.67) (-3.39) 
 
 
 
